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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Secretariat.

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Introduction

In both developing countries and developed countries one of the most significant and ubiquitous changes in the last decade has been the unprecedented increase in levels of population mobility. Movement away from the home place on a permanent or temporary basis has become an option to improve life chances for a much wider spectrum of the population than ever before, particularly in developing countries. Whereas in the past possible relocation was usually only part of the calculus of choice for narrowly defined socio-economic, gender, age, ethnic and cultural groups, it has now become available much more broadly across societies. Population mobility remains a selective process but it is now not only increasing exponentially in its scale but also in the diversity of the groups involved. Population movements have also become more complex with respect to the types of movement (especially the huge diversity of important non-permanent mobility) and the spatial patterns of that movement. This is of importance not only from the perspective of its influence in causing interregional differences in the level and nature of population growth but also because of its significance for economic development and social change. Population movements have profound effects upon economic and social changes in the areas of origin and destination and among the migrants themselves. Equally, social and economic processes are important in shaping the pattern of population movement. This complex two-way relationship between population movement on the one hand and economic development and social change on the other is little understood and remains the major focus of migration research. One dimension of this complex relationship that has, however, been inexplicably neglected is that involving the family.

In both developing countries and developed countries the last decade has seen parametric shifts in the structure and functioning of families with the most profound demographic, social and economic consequences. The extent to which this shapes, and is influenced by, changes in population movement has not been addressed to any substantial degree in the literature. The neglect of the family dimension in migration research, however, extends further. Much of this research adopts as a unit of study the individual migrant and ignores the significance of the family as an important and meaningful group in shaping migration decision-making. Moreover, a large amount of migration is of families or parts of families rather than of individuals and the adjustment at the destination is frequently undertaken by persons as a family group rather than as totally isolated individuals.

The present paper explores some aspects of the role of the family in population movement as well as the influence of migration upon changing patterns of family structure and functioning. While families have undergone massive changes in both developing and developed countries, the major focus will be upon developing countries where, it could be argued, changes in both family and migration patterns have been more substantial and more profound in their impact than those in developed countries. This is not to say that the relationship is not important in developed countries and some dimensions of it will be reviewed in the latter part of this paper. Nevertheless most attention is placed upon developing countries, especially in Asia where the present writer has had the most firsthand experience.

This paper firstly attempts to outline briefly the broad changes that are occurring in the patterns and types of population mobility in developing countries. It then focuses upon the role of the family in this population movement and discusses the processes that lead to migration and the ways in which population movement is used as a strategy to ensure and enhance the well-being of the family group. It is argued that the development of family-based social networks plays a critical role in sustaining and increasing the level of movement. Some of the possible implications of these patterns for developing countries for the 1990s are discussed. Finally some dimensions of the role of the family in shaping population mobility patterns in developed countries are reviewed.

I. Changing patterns and types of population movement in developing countries

In traditional societies the family was not only the basic social unit but also the fundamental unit of economic organization. In their attempts to survive under especially difficult conditions, or in more normal circumstances to improve their life chances, families have long developed and employed particular mobility strategies. Such strategies could either involve the entire family moving or could involve families (or more usually the patriarch) allocating some of their constituent members to work in other localities. Some of the earliest forms of human organization such as hunting and gathering and shifting cultivation involved population mobility as an integral part of the family's survival strategy. However, in such societies, family members tended to range over a very restricted "well-trodden social space" [88]. This situation has been totally transformed in recent years in a number of ways. Such allocations of family labour to locations other than the area of origin have been used by a broader spectrum of types of families in a wider variety of contexts and, most importantly, ranging over a much more extensive territorial space. These processes have been an important element in the enormous increase in the scale, complexity and significance for economic and social change of population mobility in developing countries over the last decade.

Permanent relocations of people within developing countries have become greater, in particular the displacement of people from rural to urban areas has gathered momentum over the last decade, especially in Africa and Asia. It has been pointed out ([82], p. 151) that the rate of urbanization is a sensitive index of intensity of the redistribution of population from rural to urban areas. This can be defined as the average annual rate of change of the percentage urban and is equal to the difference between the urban population growth rate and the total (urban and rural combined) population growth rate. Table 1 shows that the rate of growth of urbanization increased from 1.86 per cent per annum in the late 1970s to 2.42 per cent in the late 1980s. Hence population redistribution from rural to urban areas was very intense in the 1980s and will continue into the 1990s as the table shows. The extent of rural-urban migration has been highest in Asia where the rate of urbanization in the 1985-1990 period was 3.1 per cent per annum.

Table 1. Rate of urbanization, a/ less developed regions by major areas, 1975-2025

Major area	1975-1980	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2020-2025
Less developed regions	1.86	2.42	2.10	1.80	1.01
Africa	1.91	2.02	1.92	1.75	1.15
Latin America	1.20	0.87	0.72	0.59	0.31
Asia b/	2.04	3.05	2.57	2.22	1.14
Oceania c/	0.67	1.41	1.57	1.76	1.71

Source: *World Urbanization Prospects, 1990* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.XIII.6).

a/ Rate of urbanization is defined as the average annual exponential rate of growth of the percentage urban. It equals the difference between the growth rate of the urban population and the growth rate of the total population.

b/ Excluding Japan.

c/ Excluding Australia-New Zealand.

While the increase in permanent migrations in many developing countries has been substantial in the last two decades, the increased volume of non-permanent movement has been especially marked in most contexts. This has involved a vast array of types of commuting, circular migration involving periods of absence from the home place ranging from a few days to several years and a range of seasonal movements. This mobility is extremely difficult to quantify since it is usually not detected in conventional migration questions routinely used in censuses and national surveys [28]. However, an impressive and growing array of field evidence (e.g. [32], [57], [58] and [75]) indicates that movements of this type are of greatly increased significance in most developing countries. For example, in Java it is estimated that one in four rural households at least have a worker employed in an urban area [32]. Much of the mobility occurs between rural and urban areas and is adding to the blurring of the distinction between urban and rural areas since many people who have their permanent place of residence in rural areas actually work for considerable periods of the year in urban areas.

Perhaps one of the most unexpected of the many changes in the migration situation in several developing countries over the last two decades has been the substantial increase in international migration in and out of these countries [40]. These movements have many dimensions that vary in significance from country to country but the following are particularly important:

(a) The growing flow of migrants (both permanent and temporary) from developing countries to developed countries. This South-North flow not only involves movements into the longstanding destination countries of Australia, Canada and the United States of America but also areas that for centuries have been regarded more as regions of emigration than of immigration: Europe and even Japan;

(b) Massive movements of labour from developing countries, on an intentionally temporary basis, into capital-rich, labour-deficit countries. In particular these include the oil-rich countries of the Middle East and the newly industrializing areas of Asia such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province, China [72];

(c) The increasing significance of refugee-humanitarian flows out of developing countries;

(d) Increased flows of transient highly skilled labour from one country to another [66]. Some developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America [65], continue to be detrimentally affected by brain-drain-type net losses of their most highly skilled citizens. Nevertheless in some countries such as India, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea it is argued that such movement makes a greater contribution to the development of the home country by the backflow of remittances than would have been the case had the migrants remained at home [9].

(e) Of particular significance is the totally unprecedented increase in the extent of illegal undocumented migration of which the Mexico-United States flow is the best known but only one of the myriads of such flows. These are sustained by well-developed family and institutional networks.

In such a limited space it is not possible to do justice to the transformation that has occurred in the population movement patterns in developing countries. There are, however, a number of general observations that should be made about these burgeoning flows. The first important element is the tremendous increase in the significance of women in these flows ([11] and [82]), which is true of both internal and international movements, permanent and temporary flows and legal and illegal migrations. A second feature of the present pattern is the interrelatedness of different forms of mobility. It is clear that various forms of temporary movement for business or tourism encourage and channel more permanent movements. In this context an important question is the extent to which the rapidly increasing extent of circular migration will eventually be transformed into permanent relocation. The evidence here is mixed, with some studies showing that temporary migration is a first stage in which movers gradually establish themselves at a

destination in preparation for eventual relocation while in other contexts circular migration is an entrenched and enduring mobility strategy in its own right. However, it is true that no matter how temporary a migration stream may seem to be there is usually some settlement of migrants at the destination. A third major trend has been the increased involvement of government intervention in attempting to influence the scale, direction and composition of population flows both within and between countries.

In summarizing these changes, however, one must observe that improvements in the methods and procedures to measure and analyse population mobility have not kept pace with the increasing scale and significance of the phenomenon itself. Indeed little progress has been made. Even with respect to permanent internal migration many developing countries do not include a question on place of previous residence in their censuses [81] and even where such questions are incorporated they often use concepts that greatly compromise their effectiveness in obtaining a comprehensive picture of permanent relocations of population within boundaries [71]. Similarly, important national surveys such as annual labour force and socio-economic surveys rarely include a question on migration. Even demographic surveys have failed to recognize the significance of population mobility as an important explanatory variable. The situation with respect to non-permanent movements is worse. Despite almost two decades of field surveys producing incontrovertible empirical confirmation of the scale and significance of the phenomenon, there have been no advances in methodology to allow representative data to be collected in national censuses and surveys. More effort needs to be expended in developing appropriate questions on place of work in order to detect important non-permanent flows of people within developing countries.

A similar failure regarding methodology and data collection must unfortunately be reported for international population movements. Very few developing countries have adequate systems of recording inflows and outflows of people across their national borders although there is a great deal of expertise and knowledge that has been accumulated in the experience of such countries as Australia, Canada and the United States. Such information is becoming not only of demographic significance in developing countries but also of crucial importance in social and economic planning. Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka are just four countries in which the outflow of people is the major foreign-exchange-earning "export". There may well be some advantage for those countries experiencing significant emigration outflows to include in their censuses and national surveys a question on whether a family member is absent overseas.

Hence the lack of quantification of the evolving trends in the patterns and types of population movement in developing countries is only partly due to limitations of available space and is largely due to a lack of adequate available data. Improvements in data collection procedures and a focused and thorough analysis of the relevant new data sources that will become available in the next few years (especially the 1990 round of censuses) must be an important priority for the 1990s. It should also be pointed out that a significant shortcoming of migration research based on surveys of various kinds is the failure to utilize the family as the unit of research. By focusing upon individuals such surveys are structuring their results so that important roles played by the family in shaping the migration process are not detected.

II. Macrostructural forces shaping population mobility in developing countries

The causes of the huge increase in population mobility in developing countries are many and complex and cannot be elaborated in detail here. However, it is important to point out that in large part it is the increasing tempo of economic and social changes that must be at the core of any comprehensive explanation. Massey [49] has made the important observation that it is economic development rather than stagnation that engenders population movement, at least in the short to medium term. Hence in developing countries with large rural populations, developments in agriculture have been of tremendous significance in pushing large numbers of people out of rural areas. Land enclosure, increased commercialization of agricultural practices, mechanization and replacement of labour with capital inputs have continued apace in many developing countries. To take one example, at the 1980 census, Indonesia had 55.9 per cent of its 51 million workers employed in agriculture but by 1990, for the first time in its history, Indonesia had fewer people employed in agriculture than in other activities [36]. Moreover it is anticipated that, during the 1990s there will be a significant displacement of labour from this sector. This is partly due to ongoing changes in wet rice cultivation, evident since the 1970s, involving the substitution of mechanical hulling for hand milling, the increased commercialization of labour use and the use of more efficient methods of harvesting. However, a new round of labour-displacing changes are taking place in the 1990s including the direct seeding of rice instead of transplanting, the use of pesticides instead of labour-intensive weeding and the increased use of hand tractors that could displace as much as a third of the agricultural workforce, many of them women [36]. Another important development has been the tremendous increase in education provision since 1970 in developing countries. Many developing countries in several years have achieved the goal of universal education, at least to the primary level. This has encouraged migration by making young people unhappy with a career in agriculture, thereby increasing their aspirations and opening up a wider world of opportunity to them.

Other important influences include the internationalization of capital, which has enabled many transnational corporations to establish manufacturing operations in low labour-cost developing countries. The enormous improvements in the speed, cost and ease of transport have made the most remote village accessible to the wider world. Similarly, the spread of mass communications is an underrated force in disseminating information about opportunities apparently available at distant locations. In Indonesia, television ownership has increased from less than one in ten households in the mid-1970s to one in three in 1990. Moreover satellite-based systems ensure the instant transmission of information to the most remote villages. Another underestimated (and understudied) element in the proliferation of population mobility has been the growth and expansion of a migration industry that seeks to facilitate (and profit from) various types of internal and international population movements. This involves an enormous variety of recruiters, agents, lawyers, transport operators, factory supervisors and travel facilitators of various kinds who have become key actors in many migration systems. It should also be noted that there have been important political interventions encouraging population movement such as government involvement in immigration and labour recruitment programmes, political insecurity creating refugee flows and government land-settlement schemes.

This rapidly changing economic, social and political context in developing countries has been favourable to the development of an increased scale of population mobility. However, it is the contention of the present writer that in order to understand fully the evolving level, pattern and implications of this population movement, it is important and necessary to supplement such macro-level analysis with a consideration of processes operating at the micro-level. Pre-eminent among these elements in many developing countries is the role of the family in shaping who moves, what type of movement they engage in, where they go to, what they do at the destination and what the effects of the movement are.

III. The family as a unit of analysis in population mobility in developing countries

Classical and neo-classical economics theories of migration explain migration as occurring as a result of differences in wage rates between one region and another [42] and [60]. Todaro [77] made the theory more realistic by explaining that migration occurs due to expected wage differentials between the country of origin and the potential destination. However, these theories were found to have very limited explanatory power in developing countries and it has been argued (e.g. [76]) that one of the reasons for this was that they assumed that movers were atomistic [49]; that is, that they operated in a totally individual way. In fact it is clear that a great deal of migration in developing countries occurs as a result of decisions taken by families rather than individuals. Moreover even when migration is undertaken by individuals rather than a family unit, it is often as a result of family members being allocated to different labour markets by the family. While models based on individuals may have considerable applicability in the context of developed countries, it is of crucial importance to understand that in developing countries the family has traditionally been the unit within which most decisions about production, investment and consumption are taken. Many decisions about the population movement of individuals in such contexts therefore are taken by the family or the senior member(s) of the family, usually older males. Hence decisions about movement may or may not coincide with the wishes and interests of the individual who moves. It is well established in the case-study literature that a great deal of the decision-making regarding population movement is carried out at the family rather than at the individual level (e.g. [15], [23], [68], [86] and [87]. Moreover these writers maintain that a focus on the family rather than on the individual allows broader macro-structural forces as well as those forces operating on the individual to be better taken into account. They in effect argue that focusing on intermediate units such as families, household, village communities or kin groups can be viewed as bridging the gap between social and individual levels of analysis.

In some traditional situations where the family is the unit of production, the family, usually by its participation, distributes its labour resources over the range of tasks necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of production. Since there is a range of tasks with difficult requirements and individual family members have different capacities, characteristics and skills, there is a division of labour so as to make what is thought to be the best possible use of the human capital available to the family. In many traditional systems, this often involved allocating to individual family members off-farm as well as on-farm tasks, although in most cases the off-farm tasks would be located quite close to the land that the family was cultivating. In allocating its labour, the traditional family sought to achieve two objectives: the maximization of production and income on the one hand and the minimization of risk on the other. The latter is especially important since many such families led a knife-edge existence and had no surplus available to absorb the effects of failure. One of the important strategies of risk minimization was the diversification of sources of income and types of production so that failure in one area would not necessarily result in a total economic disaster for the family. Hence in such contexts families adopt survival strategies that involve the allocation of their labour between a range of tasks in a range of locations, which represents a trade-off between maximizing total production or income and minimizing risk. Population mobility is an important part of this strategy because the family not only gains access to new and additional sources of income at locations other than in the vicinity of the family home place but also diversifies its portfolio of different types of sources of income. Hence the risk of the family not having any income at all is minimized since it would be unlikely that both on-farm and off-farm sources of income would be likely to fail at the same time.

Rahmato [59] has suggested that coping with risk is a central part of the peasant economy and that peasants develop particular anticipatory strategies to insure themselves against death and hardship. Hence survival strategies involving some form of population mobility can take the form of either a response to the onset of a crisis (e.g. crop failure, destruction of a major family source

of income by fire, flood etc.) or as an "insurance policy" against the possible future failure of an important source of family income.

In some cases, the family makes the decisions about population mobility only for certain members of the family group. For example, Torres ([79], p. 31), found that in the Philippines there is a distinct gender differential in poor families. Whereas males generally were found to make relatively autonomous decisions, the dynamics of decision-making with young girls was different. Usually girls who have left school are expected to stay indoors or to work in the company of their parents and other elders. Young women even require permission from their elders and brothers to leave the house. More often than not, they move around with relatives. Hence, information on job opportunities in metropolitan Manila for girls is filtered through the social group who are vested with normative authority to decide for the girls. Filial piety, or respect for elders, is another strong Filipino value. Young women, therefore, would be expected to respect decisions from their kin group, including those pertaining to accepting work in Manila.

In fact the kinship system often determines who in the family will migrate [63]. This can be determined on the basis of age, order of birth within the family and gender as well as the particular skills and attributes of the different individuals making up the family group. In some situations, families adopt deliberate strategies whereby older children are kept away from school to work on the family farm while younger children are given schooling in preparation for migration ([13], p. 46). In the Philippines, Lauby and Stark ([41], pp. 481-482) point out that, for farm work, sons are considered less dispensable so daughters tend to be sent to urban centres to remit money back to their village-based families to alleviate economic pressures at their origin. Table 2 below, for example, shows in a study of Filipino migration ([19], p. 259) that when a woman makes her first rural to urban migration the decision maker is frequently not the woman herself.

Table 2. Person who made decision in first rural-urban migration by age at time of move, Philippines

	Age at the time of move			
	15-19	*20-24*	*25+*	*Total*
Decision maker	*(Percentage)*			
Migrant herself	58	47	46	54
Husband	5	25	37	13
Parents	16	8	5	13
Other relative	16	15	3	15
Non-relative	5	4	9	5
Total a/	100	100	100	100
Number of people in sample	704	214	117	1 035

Source: E. M. Go, "The relationship between female migration and economic activity in the Philippines", doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992.

a/ Owing to rounding, some totals may not add up to 100.

The simple adaptive or survival strategies outlined above, or some versions of them, have operated in many traditional societies. They rely on sets of intergenerational relationships in which primary loyalties and the flows of wealth produced are directed to the parents [8]. The changed contexts in developing countries over the last decade or so have expanded enormously

the geographical extent of the area over which the family can allocate its labour resources. Whereas the bulk of the mobility associated with the family's deployment of its labour resources has previously been in and around the locality in which the family is located, the contextual shifts briefly summarized earlier have widened the area over which family members can range in search of work.

There has been a huge geographical expansion of labour markets over the last decade or so within countries so that whereas, for most jobs, labour markets were previously local or regional, many markets now cover a whole country, or most of it. This especially applies to those labour markets centred on major metropolitan areas, which typically draw labour from the total national space. Indeed it is true to say that many labour markets overlap national boundaries. It has been recognized that for some highly specialized occupations labour markets are practically global so managers, professionals, highly skilled individuals and academics move frequently between countries as they acquire experience and seniority within their particular labour market [66]. However, such international extension of labour markets is no longer confined to a highly skilled élite. It is clear, for example, that the agricultural industry in the United States draws its labour from well beyond the Rio Grande. Similarly Filipino women seem to have made the market for domestic workers an almost global one while the interflows of workers between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is increasingly great in scale and diversity ([34] and [35]) so that some labour markets traverse all three countries.

The sum of individual migration decisions does not necessarily add up to a family migration strategy since the overall imperatives of the family may necessitate an individual family member being allocated a quite different task (and pattern of movement) to that which they may wish or expect given their particular individual characteristics. Families tend to be very careful in the way in which they allocate their labour. Massey [49] describes a situation where rural Mexican families send their better educated children to Mexico City where they can obtain white collar employment and the lesser educated members to the United States where they can gain work in agriculture or blue-collar occupations. Such a strategy is not only a realistic matching of family members' characteristics to available opportunities, but also spreads the families' income risk over three locations. Indeed such a spreading of risk may even reduce the pressure on the family's farm so that it can experiment more with innovative crops, and new and different agricultural techniques etc. [76].

The issue of risk minimization in family-migration decision-making is very important. It means, for example, that wage differentials between areas are not necessary for migration to occur since the family member may be allocated to an area to work predominantly to expand the portfolio of the family's income-generating opportunities and not because wage rates are higher at the destination than at his or her place of origin.

The enormous expansion in non-permanent forms of population mobility in developing countries can not be explained in terms of conventional classical and neo-classical economics migration theory but can only be understood when the family perspective outlined above is adopted. The deployment of individual family members for periods at distant locations allows the family to take advantage of periodic lulls in demand for labour in the home area or of temporary upswings in demand at the potential destination. It is definitely in the family's interest to inject an element of circularity into the mobility of its members because it still allows the family to access the labour of the individual at the home place during periods of peak demand. Perhaps more importantly it allows the family to keep control of those individuals or, more significantly, the wealth that they generate. The evidence is that remittances back to the village-based family tend to attenuate over time as the migrant becomes more settled at the destination. Moreover patriarchal authority over the migrant is also likely to diminish the longer that the family member is away from its direct influence. In addition, the costs of deploying a single family member rather than the entire family to a particular destination on a temporary basis can reduce the overall costs of movement and maximize the returns. This is because a single male may be able to live more cheaply at the destination than a family can by sharing crowded barrack-type

accommodation or even sleeping at his workplace or in the open. Similarly earning in the city but spending in the village ensures that earnings go much further since the cost of food and housing tends to be cheaper in the village. This especially applies if a family member is being deployed to an overseas or often very distant location. In some cases particular types of family members are sent away because the family feels that they are more likely to be reliable in remitting their incomes back to the village. For example, Ong ([54], p. 30) reports that in Malaysia unmarried daughters are subject to greater pressure from their families than the sons are to share their urban-based income with other family members. This also has been found to be the case in the Philippines ([67], p. 96 and [80], p. 95) and Thailand [18]. Tongudai ([78], p. 148) found in a study of female migrants in Bangkok that three in four sent back remittances to their village-based families. In some cases wages for up to one year were withdrawn in advance by parents as soon as the job had been arranged. This was especially the case for domestic and factory workers.

The fact that the family or household is the key unit in migration decision-making should not be necessarily interpreted as reflecting that there has been a democratic discussion among family members resulting in a consensus decision about a particular mobility strategy. Often it is a patriarchal decision as to what would be in the best interests of the family group. Recent research suggests however that the hitherto widespread belief that women played little role in family migration decision-making is being strongly challenged. In many contexts women are in fact active and central in decision-making processes affecting family groups and it is incorrect to characterize them as passive associational followers of male migrants [33].

At several points in the present paper, it has been mentioned that family-based population mobility decision-making may take the form of a survival or an adaptive strategy. This is an important distinction although in many cases the strategies have elements of both. The allocation of family labour over a wider area can firstly take the form of a response to a specific crisis situation in which the deployment of family members is indeed a survival strategy upon which the survival of the family will depend. Hence Corbett [14] shows how households who live in a context in which there are periodic problems in obtaining stable and adequate access to food develop strategic plans to minimize the impact of food shortages. From the African literature she was able to identify sequences of household responses to the onset of famine, and a simple model of famine-coping strategies is presented in table 3 below.

Table 3. Famine-coping strategies, Africa

Stage	*Strategy*
1. Declining entitlements to food	Increased petty commodity production and trading a/ Dispersed grazing a/ Change in cropping and planting practices Migration to towns a/ Collection of wild foods a/ Interhousehold transfers and loans Credit from merchants and moneylenders Migration to rural areas a/ Rationing of food consumption
2. Sale or loss of productive assets	Sale of productive household assets Food distributed by relief programmes Sale of possessions
3. Full crisis response	Break up of household or family a/ Distress migration of the entire family a/

Source: Jane Corbett, "Famine and household coping strategies". *World Development*, vol. 16, No. 9 (Oxford, 1988), pp. 1099-1112.

a/ Strategy often involving mobility.

It can be seen from the table that family migration responses are involved in two of the three stages. In the first stage of the onset of declining entitlements to food, families will undertake a series of responses that do not lead to a disposal of their key productive assets. One such response is to deploy family labour as widely as possible in order to earn income for the family's subsistence from areas not effected by the famine. As Corbett ([14], p. 1107) points out, the responses undertaken in this first stage of a coping strategy can be interpreted as forms of self or interhousehold insurance and many of them may have been developed to cope with predictable and non-severe risks.

Families may be able to support themselves using these strategies for long periods but if the famine persists there will come a time, a second stage, when their key productive assets will be disposed of.

Finally there is a third or terminal stage at which households are destitute or virtually assetless. In these circumstances a household's ability to generate either current or future income is severely diminished. Even the sale of its own labour power may no longer be as possible if household members are weakened by hunger or hunger-related disease. Both African and Asian case-studies suggest that distress migration of the whole household in search of relief may be the only option that remains at this point ([14], p. 1107).

The mobility elements in the sequence shown in table 3 represent the survival strategies but it is possible to recognize situations where families deploy their labour through some form of population mobility not because the very survival of the family is in question but as an adaptive strategy to shifts in the pattern of available opportunities. In such contexts the strategy is not so much one of survival as one of maintenance of the family's level of living (or in some cases enhancement of it) and insuring against any possible future threat to that level.

An important element in the use of population mobility by families as a labour allocation mechanism is that the family (or, more commonly, the patriarch) can maintain sufficient control over the absent family members so that the earnings they generate are repatriated back to the family of origin. The system is predicated on the movers continuing to observe the traditional system of intergenerational obligations, although they are not co-resident with the figures of authority in that system. There is evidence that, in some contexts (e.g. in Malaysia and the Philippines), this control is more effectively exercised over young women than young men. Rodenburg [62] found that in north Sumatra, Indonesia, a strong mutual moral obligation was felt between family members living in the village and members who had moved elsewhere. Clearly a circular strategy is more likely to enable the family to access resources generated by family members working elsewhere than if the family members migrate permanently away from the home area.

In sum, a comprehensive explanation of the increased scale and complexity of contemporary population mobility in developing countries needs to go beyond an understanding of the macroeconomic, social and political changes occurring in those countries. It must encompass an appreciation of how family and household strategies of decision-making operate in that changing environment. One important element in such an appreciation is the operation of family-based social networks.

IV. Social networks in the migration process in developing countries

An important element in understanding how population mobility operates within the framework of family-labour-allocation strategies are family-based social networks, which link origin and destination. Migrants in developing countries are stereotypically characterized as wide-eyed, naive individuals arriving at their international or large-city destination not knowing anyone and overwhelmed by the alien nature of that destination. The majority of movers, however, move along well-trodden paths which, even if they have not travelled them before themselves, have been traversed earlier by family members and friends. The movers tend to travel with friends or family and have a range of family-based contacts at the destination. The networks that are established, linking origin and destination, become key elements in sustaining and enhancing the population flows between them. These networks inject a self-perpetuating dynamism into flows of population, which allows movement to continue long after the original, usually economic, reasons for the flow may have been superseded or rendered redundant. Whenever a person in a developing country migrates every individual that they know acquires some social capital in the form of a contact at the mover's destination and the quality of that social capital is greatly enhanced if the contact is a family member.

The networks established by earlier generations of movers from families and localities act as conduits to channel later generations of movers to those destinations in an atmosphere of certainty. Previous generations of movers have not only supplied valuable information and encouragement, but also often paid for or arranged and eased the subsequent migration of other family members. Moreover, when the migrant arrives at the destination, that end of the network lends valuable assistance in the adjustment process, especially by assisting in gaining access to housing and employment. The fundamental role of networks is to reduce significantly the risks associated with migration and indeed many movers in developing countries operate in an environment of almost total certainty owing to family-based conditions. Hence, again, the risk minimization factor is important.

The role of family-based networks in facilitating the bulk of population movement in developing countries can scarcely be exaggerated. While other factors undoubtedly are necessary to initiate the beginning of a new limb of the network, once the pioneer(s) is (are) established at a new destination the subsequent flow can be rapid. The pioneer migrants constitute anchors to chains along which much larger numbers of subsequent migrants are drawn. In the case of international migration they are especially important. The pioneers can be people who gain access to a destination country through some form of recruitment or refugee migration but then can facilitate substantial subsequent movement through a legal family reunification movement. Indeed the family migration programmes of countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States institutionalize the role of social networks in facilitating international migration. Yet illegal migration is virtually impossible unless there is an informal network linking origin and destination to facilitate the clandestine movement. The pioneer migration may have occurred for quite adventitious reasons but, once established, the flow may take on mass proportions.

The important point about the development of family-based networks is that, once created, they totally change the entire environment in which subsequent movement occurs. The networks that are established not only link individual family members with friends and other family members at a range of destinations, but also often with potential employers as well. Frequently a patron-client, mutual dependence relationship develops between an employer and a family or groups of families from a particular origin. This relationship not only guarantees the potential migrants with work but also assures the employer of a regular and trusted supply of labour. Hence employers are drawn into the family-based social networks. Indeed it is incorrect to characterize these networks purely as social, based entirely on the connections of family and longstanding friendship. Over time they became more complex involving not only employers but

also other elements whose role is to facilitate movement along the networks for profit. Hence a myriad of agents, recruiters, travel agents, transport operators, supervisors etc. position themselves at critical points along the networks to facilitate the flow of movers along it. One example [72] of such a pattern is presented in figure I, which shows the number of such intermediaries involved in a network along which illegal migrants flow from a village in east Java to work on plantations in peninsular Malaysia. The growing complexity and institutionalization of networks over time is thus an important feature in many developing countries.

Another example of these complex networks of agents is in the substantial flow of Filipino (mostly female) entertainers into Japan. Torres ([79], p. 57) reports that a complex network of underground travel agents, talent promoters and job brokers are known to expedite the illegal entry of entertainers into Japan.

While networks have an important function of informing potential new migrants of the availability, or lack of availability, of job opportunities, one of the most important features of the networks established by migrants is the role they have in sustaining population flows quite independently of objective economic conditions in the communities of origin and destination. Moreover they can operate largely outside the area of influence of policy makers. Migration flows occurring along such networks are notoriously difficult to influence by policy interventions, let alone stop. Almost all attempts to prevent such movements in the past have failed. The networks are enormously resilient and tenacious even in the face of the most vigorous and draconian actions of Governments. Hence, once established, the networks became a very strong force for perpetuating particular streams of movement. Knowledge of the persistence of these flows along networks in the long term, however, is extremely limited. It has been suggested that particular flows may follow a logistic curve with a few people moving initially, then a rapid increase in movement, followed by a tapering off when a particular threshold level is reached.

The linkages established between the communities of origin and destination do not only become channels for the movement of people back and forth, but they also operate as important conduits of information, money and goods in both directions. The issue of remittances from the destination to the place of origin is of major significance. The conventional wisdom about remittances in the 1970s was that they usually had little impact on development since they generally were small in size and were spent on non-productive investments in the place of origin [45]. However, as more careful studies of remittances have been made over the last decade this wisdom has undergone a substantial revision in the following respects:

(a) Past measurement of remittances has at best been partial and has severely underestimated their scale because of severe deficiencies in the definitions and time scales used in surveys. Moreover the most important remittances can often be those supplied in an emergency situation: indeed, the certainty that support will be available from family members based elsewhere when and if needed can have a significant effect on development activity in the home area [30];

(b) The dismissal of use of remittances as being non-productive has been too hasty because it has ignored the multiplier effects of investments in land and housing and the second and third round effects of such investments in the place of origin.

In the case of international migration flows it is clear that remittances not only have a very significant impact in the communities of origin of migrants, but also important macroeconomic impacts upon national economies.

The crucial significance of networks in sustaining and developing particular migration flows has been overlooked in many attempts to explain migration in developing countries. It is clear, however, that the development of networks is facilitated where the extended family is the rule. In such systems the patriarch (or in a few cases, the matriarch) is able to deploy family members to particular areas and retain control over them and the wealth flows that they generate.

Figure 1. Example of a recruitment network of prospective labour migrants (illegal) from east Java to Malaysia



Source: Based on data supplied by E. Spaan, Taikongs and Calos, "The role of middlemen and brokers in Javanese international migration", *International Migration Review* (New York, forthcoming).

The development of networks explains (where the classical and neo-classical theories fail to) why neighbouring communities with apparently identical economic and social circumstances can have totally different levels and patterns of population movement. Communities that have established a network of external linkages will tend to have a substantial level of out-movement while those without such linkages will have low levels of mobility. Networks can not only function to facilitate and sustain the movement of family members, but they can also be used to exert and maintain the family's control of the member who has moved. Hence Rodenburg ([62], p. 59) describes the movement of Toba Batak traders from their rural origins in north Sumatra, Indonesia, to cities in the following terms:

> "Upon their first arrival in town, most of the traders stay with friends or relatives. Related affines usually provide shelter and funds during the initial period when the new migrant is still struggling to find his way to set up his enterprise. Living with co-villagers also gives the men the opportunity to send messages or money when one of them returns. For a wife, this network is also important in another way since, to a certain extent, it means social control of her husband's activities. In case her husband should have an affair she may soon find out."

Family-based social networks, once established, can also operate so as to facilitate the migration of groups who previously were not permitted to move by the family. Torres ([79], p. 66), for example, maintains that the existence of these networks has been crucial in Filipino families overcoming traditional taboos and deploying their educated single young daughters to work in metropolitan Manila.

The increasing participation of women in migration is evident across both internal and international migration streams. These moves are encouraged by both the demands of the labour market, as well as by cultural expectations from the social network. Young, single, educated women are encouraged to leave their towns or villages for Manila, not only because there are few (or no) jobs for them in the rural countryside, but also because the work they will obtain in Manila will generate incomes. From their own admission, a sizeable portion of their salaries will be used for their families' sustenance back home. Given this expectation, it is not uncommon that the girls' families are the ones who make the decision for their migration.

The understanding of the operation of social networks in facilitating and sustaining migration processes is hampered by the failure of many conventional methodologies for the collection of migration data to take account of networks. Although most migration surveys question migrants about prior contacts with their destination, there are few studies that explore in detail exactly how these networks operate; who the actors in them are; who has access to them; how long they operate for and so on. While the literature on the role of networks in migration is substantial ([6], [16], [22] and [47]) there are many dimensions that remain little understood. For example, little is known of the significance of the quality of ties between groups and their influence on migration. It may be possible to recognize a hierarchy of support networks according to how much support it is possible for an individual to access from them. One such hierarchy could range from immediate family to broader family then to friends and acquaintances in the locality through to ethnic group links, and regional and nationality groupings.

V. The impact of migration on the family

It should be borne in mind that the interrelationship between migration and the family is a two-way one. However, the body of research relating to population mobility as an independent variable influencing change in family structure and functioning is very limited.

Families of migrants at the place of origin must adjust not only to the permanent or temporary absence of family members, but also to the influences of the newly acquired money, goods, ideas, attitudes, behaviour, and innovations transmitted back to them by the movers. The adjustments to these active impacts that families must make depend upon which family members move, the length of the absence, and the sociocultural system at the place of origin, especially dominant types of family structure and the degree of flexibility within that structure. Gonzalez [21] shows how various types of migration, differentiated by degree of permanency, have different impacts on family structure. Other studies suggest that kinship linkages and family residence patterns influence the households' adaptation to migration. Patrilocal societies are generally more adaptable than matrilocal, as are those in which the joint family dominates over the nuclear family ([13], p. 47).

Where temporary rather than permanent absence from the village is the norm, it is highly selective of economically active men, and separation of these men from their wives and children necessitates adjustments not only in the nuclear family, but also within the community at large. Whereas temporary migration usually involves separation of nuclear family members, permanent migration is often associated with a separation of the nuclear family from other kin and is hence characterized by a greater reliance by the spouse and children on the nuclear family, a weakening of wider kinship relationships and a consequent widening of the roles of nuclear family members, especially women ([21], p. 1274).

Female headship of incomplete nuclear families is common in areas where temporary mobility occurs. In such circumstances women and children must perform tasks traditionally done by men. Siegel [70], for example, found in Indonesia that the outmigration of Acehnese men, usually for periods of almost a year, has led women to handle additional agricultural tasks. The extent to which this occurs depends partly upon the periodicity of male mobility. Whereas on the Indonesian island of Bawean ([83], p. 121) absences may last several years, in western Java [27] most movement is over relatively short distances so that movers can return to their villages at times of peak labour demand. Another important factor in the family's adaptation to migration is whether an extended family and kinship structure exists to allow other male family members to fill roles normally assigned to the absent male. Lineton ([44], p. 66) reports that in southern Sulawesi, Bugis women have little difficulty in coping with their husbands' absence because members of the extended family move in and provide companionship and other support. Naim ([53], p. 425) found that the extended absences of Minangkabau migrant men from their western Sumatran homes created strains within the family and may have been responsible for an unusually high incidence of Oedipus complex among children and of mental disorders among women in the Minangkabau heartland.

The effects of population mobility on women's traditional roles in rural areas need systematic study. Research should encompass changes affecting women who themselves migrate and those who remain in villages where men are absent for long periods. The field work undertaken by the present writer in outmigration villages in western Java and southern Sulawesi indicated many cases of expanded roles for women. In southern Sulawesi, for example, some women in heavy outmigration areas were appointed to head their villages, although traditionally that role is reserved for males. One of the few detailed studies of the impact of heavy male circular migration from rural areas in Indonesia [12] found that in eastern Kalimantan, women's involvement in rice and vegetable production increased as a direct result of male movement. More than half of the women interviewed reported that life was difficult during their husband's absence

and most of the difficulties they mentioned related to agricultural labour, especially tree felling and fence and field-hut construction. Colfer ([12], p. 233) stresses, however, that such comments tell only part of the story. What impressed her most during her fieldwork was the women's competence in providing for their families during their husband's absence and their pride in their autonomy and competence. Their efforts to cope received strong support from other members of the community. Hetler's [26] study conducted in a village of central Java categorizes women whose husbands were absent for long periods as de facto household heads and shows how they frequently assumed the roles of de jure heads by paying taxes, providing labour and household representatives for village activities and attending meetings.

Less information is available about the impact of gender differentials in migration at urban destinations. Some studies suggest that it may lead to reduced rates of marriage in the cities and a decline in fertility (e.g. [43], p. 74). Certainly at the urban destination there tends to be a greater incidence of non-traditional family structures and living situations than in the village of origin. Households tend to be considerably larger in urban than in rural areas because of urban housing shortages caused by rapid population growth. According to the 1980 Indonesian census, the proportion of households with nine or more members was almost twice as large in urban (11.8 per cent) as in rural areas (6.1 per cent).

Rural-to-urban migration does lead to the separation of family members, creating a greater dependence on the nuclear family, weakening wider kinship relationships and consequently expanding the roles of nuclear family members, especially women ([21], p. 1274). Caldwell [8] has identified such changes as being critical to the transition from high to low fertility, which requires a reversal of the net flow of wealth. (In traditional societies the net flow is from children to parents, but in modern societies the flow is from parents to children.) Caldwell says that from a demographic viewpoint, the most important social exports from Europe have been the predominance of the nuclear family with its strong husband-wife ties and the concentration of concern and expenditure on one's children rather than on one's parents and other kin. There is some evidence that if such changes are not initiated by urbanization, they are certainly assisted by it. Although wider kinship linkages exhibit considerable tenacity in the face of the physical separation caused by mobility, the processes encouraging the physical and emotional nucleation of families are likely to impinge most strongly upon families living in urban areas. Even the strong linkages that migrants maintain with their village-based families and friends, and reinforce through return migration, encourage the diffusion of these ideas and attitudes to rural areas. Studies explicitly investigating the social effects of rural-to-urban migration on the family are lacking despite the fact that the family is often the unit of migration decision-making. Research into this important interface between migration and social change is sorely needed.

The influence of urbanward mobility on marriage has also attracted the attention of researchers. Gonzalez ([21], p. 1268) suggests that the migration-induced imbalance in sex ratios has led to a decreased incidence of arranged marriages and to marriages being contracted at a later age. In Indonesia researchers have noted strains created by difficulties in finding a spouse, inflation of dowry size ([53], p. 428), and migrants being able to marry women of much higher status or caste than would normally be the case ([44], p. 106). Evidence of the impact of temporary migration upon divorce is mixed. Hathaway ([25], p. 3) suggests that the mobility-induced separation of family members, even for short periods, leads to marital instability and the consequent permanent break-up of the family unit, whereas Gonzalez ([21], p. 1266) cites several studies of societies in which the temporary separation of husband and wife has been consistent with marital stability. A study of western Java ([27], pp. 616-617) revealed a substantially greater incidence of divorce among mover households than among stayer households, especially in households experiencing prolonged separation. A high incidence of divorce among the Minangkabau of western Sumatra has been attributed to high rates of male outmigration ([53], p. 426), whereas Lineton ([44], p. 65) suggests that the low incidence of divorce among the Bugis of Wajo is partly because nuclear families migrate as a whole.

Although it is possible to exaggerate differences between the urban and rural way of life in developing countries, there can be no doubt that some elements of social change are more evident among urban populations; for example, "the emergence of the nuclear family, the enrichment and multiplication of individual social relationships, the challenge to collective solidarity by individual freedom" ([84], pp. 157-158). Changes in intrafamily and intergenerational relationships in developing countries are usually of interest because of their effects on fertility. However, the strengthening of ties between economically active adults and their nuclear families and the weakening of ties with older parents have major implications for the welfare of older persons. In traditional societies the net intergenerational transfer not only of wealth, but also of care and attention to older persons has meant that older people could count on their children for security in old age. The reversal of net intergenerational wealth flows associated with intrafamilial changes suggests that the older generation may no longer be able to count on as much support as in the past. Signs of this are already evident in some developing areas, especially cities [29]. According to Frons, Jeffries and Nelson ([17], p. 10), "as the younger generation becomes more affluent, more materialistic - and more preoccupied with a youth-oriented Western culture - the traditional regard for the elderly is vanishing". In highly urbanized and industrialized centres of Asia such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the abandonment of old people has become a social problem. By 1982 it had become so widespread in Singapore that the Government passed a law making it compulsory for children to support their elderly parents.

Public social security programmes for the elderly in developing countries are generally inadequate [85]. Many countries have no formal programme, and in most that do, provision is extremely meagre and confined to very limited eligibility groups.

Various case-studies document the contribution of rural-to-urban migration to the reduced status and increased neglect of the aged population. In Malaysia, for example, Chan ([10], p. 10) found that in depressed states like Kelantan, age-selective outmigration leads to the neglect of elderly persons who, for various reasons, are much less mobile and have consequently been left behind. In urban areas the elderly are sometimes not much better off than their rural counterparts, where they themselves are physically and socially segregated from their families because of acute urban residential space pressures that do not facilitate the continuance of the extended family system.

There is a growing body of research that indicates that the accelerating levels of migration of women in developing countries [36] is leading to an increased incidence of children living separately from their mothers. A recent analysis of data from an international series of demographic and health surveys conducted in many developing countries from 1980 onwards has indicated a relatively high incidence of mothers and children living separately in a number of developing countries, especially in Africa [55]. A number of explanations can be put forward for this including divorce, a high incidence of fostering out of children etc.; migration does however play a significant role. Hence mothers may leave behind children in the village when they go elsewhere to work since conditions at the destination are not conducive to child care. Another common practice is for urban-based parents to send their children back to their home village to grow up under the care of grandparents, aunts or uncles in what is considered to be a more conducive, traditional environment. The separation of the nuclear family by migration in developing countries is therefore an increasingly important phenomenon and its effects need to be investigated.

Richter ([61], pp. 44-45) has investigated this issue in Thailand and explains that in urban areas, extended family members may be far away and women working at a job in the formal sector are less likely to be able to combine work and child care. The large numbers of immigrants to Bangkok include many women who migrate without their children, leaving them in the care of relatives in rural areas. Other working women in Bangkok, even those whose children are born in the city, send them to their families in their rural home towns if they are unable to care for them. Her survey in 1991 of 1,515 women in Bangkok who were married, widowed, divorced or separated found that 10 per cent of their children were living separately from their mother. Even

7 per cent of the women who had been born in Bangkok had children living separately from them. Among women who had migrated after their first year of marriage, almost a fifth (18 per cent) were living separately from their children. More than two thirds (70 per cent) of children who were living separately from their mother lived outside Bangkok.

VI. The family and international migration in developed countries

While the significance of individual decision-making in migration is of greater significance in developed countries than in developing countries, family influences upon the migration process are nevertheless important. While space constraints do not permit a detailed consideration of the family dimension of population movement in developed countries, it is useful to raise some aspects of the interrelationships. Looking first at the case of international migration, it is apparent that many of the processes discussed earlier in the present paper operate to facilitate the growing volume of South-North migration. Boyd [6] has comprehensively reviewed the research findings on the determinants and consequences of family, friendship and community networks that underlie much of the recent migration to developed countries. It is apparent from this review that family connections, family-based networks and chain migration are central to any explanation of the composition of that movement. For example, in the three traditional immigration countries of Australia, Canada and the United States, family migration has dominated the entry categories of immigrants over the last two decades. In the early postwar years, immigration policy was dominated by worker recruitment. However, in 1965 the reform of the Immigration Act in the United States made family reunification the basis of immigration policy and subsequently the overwhelming majority of immigrants entering the United States have done so under family migration provisions.

Papademetriou ([56], p. 19) has summarized the situation as follows:

> "Family reunification is almost universally accepted as the appropriate centrepiece for US immigration policy as it responds to and promotes a central principle of the US national ethos: family values. In a more practical vein, family reunification also responds to the recognition that families ease the sociocultural and psychological dislocations associated with immigration by serving as buffers and mediators between the individual immigrant and the host environment. Families thus become the facilitators of the immigrants' social, economic and gradually political integration."

Accordingly, for most years since the revision of the immigration law in 1965 about 9 out of 10 permanent immigrants to the United States enter under family-related policy categories. Despite changes following the 1990 Immigration Act, family migration remains overwhelmingly dominant in the intake of immigrants to the United States.

Australia and Canada, the other two traditional immigration countries, followed suit in the 1970s and their immigration programmes were transformed from a worker-recruitment orientation to a more complex mix in which family, skill and refugee policy categories were dominant. Family linkages became one of the major bases upon which people could qualify for settlement. These major changes in immigration policy institutionalized family-based social networks as the primary vehicle for international migration into these three traditional immigration countries. Figure II shows how family migration has increased its share of the intake into Australia in recent years.

There have been moves in all three countries at different points in the last decade to increase the significance of immigration based on qualifications and entrepreneurialism by skills and business-based migration programmes but the essential family basis of immigrant settlement in Australia, Canada and the United States has not changed. Although the provisions of the family migration programmes in the three countries have varied over the years, families have become skilled at using them to facilitate the settlement of relatives in those countries [2] and [4].

In the Australian case, a recent study by Khoo [39] examined three aspects of families and the immigration process based on a national sample of immigrants arriving in Australia between 1971 and 1990 and made the following findings:

(a) The presence of family in Australia and family sponsorship patterns: some 60 per cent of the migrants had family in Australia before they immigrated;

(b) The family as a migrating unit: almost two thirds of the migrants arrived in Australia accompanied by family members;

(c) Family structure and living arrangements after immigration: only 16 per cent of the immigrants had no family members to assist their adjustment to Australia and three quarters of them had established a family unit by the time of the survey.

Figure II. Category of immigrants, 1976-1993, Australia



Source: Bureau of Immigration and Population Research and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Australia, various publications.

It is apparent that even in a country like Australia, where great emphasis is placed upon the Government providing services for recently arrived immigrants, the family provides the bulk of such services [52]. However, it is also clear that immigration also results in changes in "family structure and functioning, to new roles and relationships within families, and perhaps to changes in some of the values which form the basis of family life in the country of origin" ([24], p. 19). Hence the family may not only be a source of stability for newly arrived migrants, but also can be an arena of conflict as family members come under the influence of a set of new forces at the destination.

In considering internal migration within developed countries the family again looms large. As Gober ([20], p. 28) has pointed out, migration patterns result from millions of decisions by individuals and families about whether, when and where to move. In fact when all moves are considered it is family- and housing-related reasons that are most frequently cited as reasons for moving as table 4 drawn from the 1991 American Housing Survey shows. However, the bulk of family-related reasons apply to moves over shorter distances while economic- and job-related factors dominate moves over far larger distances as figure III, using data from Australia [3], demonstrates.

In the case of the United States, Gober ([20], p. 29) points out that:

> "A sizeable majority of respondents reported housing or family dynamics as reasons for their move. The three most prominent reasons given were the need to establish a

new household, upgrade to a larger or better unit and other family considerations (such as to be nearer to other family members, or respond to increased or decreased family size)."

Table 4. Reasons for moving among owners and renters, United States, 1991 a/
(Percentage of respondents citing reasons)

Reasons for moving	*Total*	*Owners*	*Renters*
Displacement or disaster	7	5	8
Employment-related	28	21	31
New job or job transfer	11	10	12
To be closer to work, school or other place	11	6	13
Other financial or employment	6	5	6
Housing and family-related reasons	80	96	75
Need larger or better home	26	30	24
To establish household	14	14	14
Change in marital status	8	9	8
Change from renting to owning	6	22	-
Want lower rent or maintenance	7	4	9
Change from owning to renting	1	-	1
Other reasons	18	17	19
Other or not reported	17	18	16
Number of respondents	16 753	4 363	12 391

Source: P. Gober, "Americans on the move". *Population Bulletin*, vol. 48, No. 3 (Washington, D.C., 1993).

a/ Totals add up to more than 100 because some respondents cited more than one reason.

Figure III. Persons aged 15+: proportion who changed usual residence in Australia, by reason for moving and type of move, year ending 31 May 1987



Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1988.

The shifts in family structure and functioning in developed countries in recent years has had important impacts upon population movement patterns. Table 5 shows the extent of change in the distribution of families in Australia and the United States over the last two decades. The share of stereotypical families, i.e. two parents with children, has declined in the last two decades in developed countries while there has been a substantial growth of single-person, single-parent and couple-only families. This has had significant implications for population mobility. Increased divorce and family splitting has produced a whole new pattern of mobility for the parents and children involved. Delayed marriage, increased cohabitation before marriage and the increasing incidence of group households has not only changed the distribution of household types in developed countries but also created new patterns of population movement as well. In the United States in 1991, a quarter of all children lived with only one parent in 1991 ([1], p. 8), triple the proportion in 1960. Half of the children in the United States will spend some part of their childhood in a one-parent family. In other developed countries the proportions are somewhat lower but nevertheless substantial. For example, in Australia, 14.6 per cent of families with children in 1991 were single-parent families and at least a third will spend some time in a single-parent family [37]. This pattern of a high rate of marriage breakdown is an increasing cause of mobility of the parents since at least one of them will have to move as a result of the marriage breakdown. However, it also is inducing a new type of mobility for many of the children involving them in adopting a form of "bilocality", moving on a regular basis between two homes often separated by long distances. This form of mobility and its effects and implications for the children involved has not been a major subject of research but certainly needs to be, especially from the perspective of the well-being of the children involved.

Table 5. Composition of families in the United States and Australia
(Percentage)

	United States		*Australia*	
Type of family	*1970*	*1990*	*1976*	*1991*
Married couple with children	49.6	36.9	48.5	44.2
Married couple without children	37.1	41.7	27.9	31.6
One-parent families with children	6.4	12.0	6.5	8.8
Other families	6.9	9.4	17.1	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of families (thousands)	51 200	64 500	3 406	4 298

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1976 and 1991 and D. A. Ahlburg and C. J. De Vita, "New realities of the American family", *Population Bulletin*, vol. 47, No. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1992), pp. 1–44.

There has not only been a change in the representation of two-parent and couple families in developed countries but also within those types of families there have been changes that have impinged upon mobility. Among the most important of these is the transition from a typical pattern of male-breadwinner, female-homemaker situations to dual-income families. This is illustrated in figure IV, which shows that over the postwar period the incidence of women working outside the home has more than quadrupled in Australia [38].

Dual-income families have gone from being the exception to being the rule in a few short decades. One of the consequences of this change has been a reduction in the level of mobility of these types of families. This is a function of the fact that any shift is going to necessitate finding a job at the proposed destination for not just one family member but two family members. This has influenced the extent to which government agencies and corporations have been able to

transfer staff within and between countries as part of their traditional processes of giving experience to staff to facilitate their progression through the career cycle [73].

Figure IV. Female labour-force participation rates by age at censuses conducted in Australia between 1947 and 1991



Sources: T. H. Hull, "Conflict on the home front: work, housework and the future of fertility", paper presented to a seminar on conflict and consensus held at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982, and Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1986 and 1991 censuses.

Some of the most dramatic changes in family structure and living arrangements in recent years in developed countries have involved their elderly populations and some of these have had significant mobility consequences. Especially important is the fact that a greater proportion of elderly people in developed countries maintain independent living arrangements well into old age than ever has been the case. This is a function of greater longevity and better health as well as

greater financial security and independence than has been the case with previous generations of elderly persons. This independence has engendered a number of new forms of mobility. Some of these are associated mainly with recent retirees, especially in a context where early retirement is significant, as is the case in most developed countries, although much of this is involuntary rather than voluntary early retirement.

Freed of the necessity of living relatively close to their workplace, many retirees seek to exercise other location options that are not shaped by job-related considerations. Hence there are substantial migrations from the frostbelt to the sunbelt in northern hemisphere countries among this group ([5] and [64]). There is a significant movement from large cities to resort locations. Increasingly, too, elderly people who do not sell up their family home to migrate engage in seasonal and other short-term migration, which involves moving to more attractive ecological and climatic zones in winter [51].

In the older age groups, family-related factors are a particularly significant cause of migration. Typically older people upon widowhood or the onset of disability seek to move to live close to, if not in the same house as, their children or other family members. These motivations are evident in the reasons given by a group of older migrants surveyed in Australia [31]. Table 6 shows that many older people move for family-related reasons. It is especially notable that the motivation of moving to be close to family and friends increases with age among the elderly population. It is too often overlooked that extended family networks are still the cornerstone for the social, economic and physical support of elderly people in developed and the population mobility associated with the operation of such networks is a neglected area in both family and population mobility research.

The elderly are generally neglected in discussions of both changing patterns of family structure and population mobility. However, their growing numerical and proportional significance in developed country populations and the major changes within this subgroup in the ways in which they organize their lives means that they should be the subject of much more research as well as attention from policy makers. Changing patterns of family size in developed countries is also having an impact upon population movement patterns. Figure V shows data ([1] and [50) on the total fertility rate in two developed countries.

The pattern has been for levels of between 3 and 4 average number of births per woman in the 1950s and 1960s but declining to around 1.8 to 1.9 in the 1970s and stabilizing around those levels in the 1990s. This has meant that families are not experiencing as great a fluctuation in size between the family-formation or family-development stages of the life cycle and the pre-parent and empty nest stages of the life cycle of the family. Hence the need to make housing adjustments purely on the basis of the changing size of the family are not so great as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. This may be one of the factors contributing to a stabilizing of overall mobility levels in Australia, the United States and other developed countries over recent years ([37] and [46]).

The impact of economic depression in families in developed countries in recent years has been substantial. One disturbing trend is that while the bulk of people among the growing homeless populations in developed countries are individuals living alone or in non-family situations, the incidence of homelessness among families is increasing. Ahlburg and De Vita ([1], p. 35), for example, observe that in recent studies of the situation in the United States, around a quarter of homeless people are in family units. This group's plight involves them in a distinctive and desperate form of mobility.

By the time they become homeless, most homeless families have spent periods in a broken circle of kith and kin networks. Or, as Burt [7] writes: "They may borrow money, leave bills unpaid, double up with other families or with friends, split up a household (for example, leaving older children with relatives), leave town to look for work ... . Even with all these strategies, however, they (were) not able to afford to stay in housing."

Table 6. Reasons for moving to current dwelling of persons living in private dwellings who had moved since reaching the age of 60, Adelaide and Melbourne, 1981
(Percentage)

Reasons for moving to current dwelling	*Age of respondent*			
	60-64	*65-74*	*75+*	*Total*
Private dwelling				
Too large	23.5	20.4	17.8	20.2
Too costly	12.3	11.4	9.2	10.9
In poor condition	5.1	4.6	4.3	4.6
Other	16.9	18.5	11.9	16.1
Total	57.8	54.9	43.2	51.8
Environment				
To change environment	3.6	1.8	3.3	2.6
To access shops	5.1	6.8	4.3	5.7
Unsafe area	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.9
Too noisy	4.5	4.9	1.0	3.7
Disliked neighbourhood	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.4
Total	15.0	15.3	10.4	14.3
Family and friends				
To live with family	5.1	5.9	13.3	8.0
To be near friends	13.9	17.5	19.6	17.4
To live independently	2.4	3.3	5.3	3.7
Relatives, friends moved away	1.2	0.9	1.4	1.1
Total	22.6	27.6	39.6	30.2
Security				
Ill health of self/family	2.7	3.9	5.5	4.2
Old age	0.3	1.3	0.6	0.9
Total	3.0	5.2	6.1	5.1
Other				
Retirement	4.2	3.7	3.7	3.8
Bereavement	3.9	5.9	8.4	6.3
Eviction/demolition	6.9	5.7	7.0	6.3
Other	12.0	11.0	9.6	10.8
Total	27.0	26.3	28.7	27.2
Number of respondents	332	790	489	1 611

Source: G. H. Hugo, "Migration of the elderly in Australia", in *Elderly Migration: An International Comparative Study*. A. Rogers and W. J. Serow, *eds*. (Boulder, Colorado, Population Program, University of Colorado, 1988), chap. 7.

Thus far a few of the ways in which rapidly changing patterns of family structure and functioning in developed countries is impinging upon changing levels and patterns of population movement have been considered. However, as was pointed out earlier, the relationship between migration and family is complex and two-way. For instance, what is the impact of changing levels of population mobility upon the family? Are population mobility factors a significant independent variable in explaining changing family patterns in developed countries? Research here is extremely limited and the limited writing on this issue is based more upon value-laden specialization than upon specific and focused research. Much of the literature (e.g. see [20], p. 4; [89], pp. 77-79) sees the high levels of residential mobility in the United States and other

Figure V. Total fertility rates, a/ Australia, 1921-1991 and United States, 1940-1989



Sources: D. A. Ahlburg and C. J. De Vita, "New realities of the American family". *Population Bulletin*, vol. 47, No. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1992), pp. 1-44 and P. McDonald, *Family trends and structure in Australia: Australian family briefings*, No. 3 (Melbourne, Australian Institute of Family Studies, 1993).

a/ Defined as the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman (or group of women) during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates for a particular year.

developed countries as weakening the ties of individuals in developed countries to a place.* The breaking down of people's sense of identification and commitment to their home place usually tends at the same time to reduce the strength of ties of individuals to their family of origin. Gober ([20], p. 4) summarizes the interpretations of this weakening of local ties into two broad positions as follows:

(a) Some see it as a positive development representing "... freedom from the familiar, one's position in society, family obligations and expected behaviours. Migrants are risk takers by seeking out new places, new opportunities and new people. Innovation emerges from the synergism of people from a variety of backgrounds sharing ideas, contacts and know how";

(b) The second position emphasizes the negative aspects whereby high levels of migration "... can disrupt schooling for children, interfere with one career in a dual career household, force an emotionally wrenching sale of a family home, and change some or all of life's daily patterns. The sum of these disruptions at a societal level leads to a personal isolation, breakdown in family life and the loss of a sense of community".

The overall thrust of writing about the effects of high levels of residential mobility upon the family is of negative impacts associated with separation from the wider extended family and the rupturing of the social bonds held by individual family members caused by the move itself. While this position undoubtedly has considerable applicability it only tells part of the story. Moreover it is rarely backed up by research-based evidence. Its fundamental flaw is the confusion of the geographical with the emotional separation of family members. While undoubtedly greater mobility has led to a wider dispersal of family members, at the same time there have been developments that allow family members not only to maintain but also to significantly enhance emotional family-based ties. These developments in transport and communication facilitate the maintenance of regular and close contact as is apparent from:

(a) The almost total universality of telephone ownership accompanied by a massive cheapening of long-distance telephoning;

(b) The associated development of other forms of communication such as computer-based systems and facsimile machines;

(c) The massive improvements and cheapening in all forms of long-distance transportation especially air travel and interstate highway systems.

It simply can no longer be maintained that geographical propinquity is a necessary condition for the maintenance of regular (even daily) close, personal contact between family members. There is a great need to investigate these issues in depth, especially given the ageing of the population in developed countries and the need to develop systems of support for the elderly that significantly involve family members, which is the basis of most care policies for the aged in contemporary developing countries.

It is apparent that return migration is a significant factor in countries such as the United States. Gober ([20], p. 19) explains that a fifth of all moves made between States in the United States consist of people moving back to the State where they were born. Such a pattern is hardly consistent with an explanation of movers severing their ties with their home place.

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*Gober ([20], p. 3) states that in the early 1990s, around 17 per cent of persons changed their usual place of residence in a single year in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States; 9-15 per cent in France, Israel, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and somewhat less in Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.

Settles [69] has recently emphasized the centrality of family mobility in world history. There has been a tendency to emphasize stability as a "moral good and characteristic of satisfactory family life in general" [69] but the reality is that movement and change in family life are more the typical experience of life than the unusual exception. As Hartley ([24], p. 18) has pointed out, "movement and change is intrinsic to family life".

VII. Conclusions

Over the last decade, population mobility in a complex variety of forms has become a major adaptive and survival strategy across a broad spectrum of groups in many developing countries. The stereotypical view of most residents of these countries as being rural-based individuals who rarely travel outside the boundaries of the ancestral community has never been fully accurate but it certainly is not appropriate to the contemporary situation. Population movements within and between countries have expanded enormously with substantial economic, social and demographic consequences for the individuals involved and the communities out of and into which they move. Yet the understanding of these changes remains limited. Indeed in most countries the scale of population movement is not accurately known, let alone its composition, causes and implications. There is a pressing need for more attention to be given to the conceptualization, measurement and analysis of patterns of population movement in developing countries. Such attention needs to be more comprehensive in its coverage of different types of movement since it is clear that many types of mobility that are not detected by conventional census and survey methods are of considerable economic and social significance. These include the complex range of non-permanent mobility strategies and clandestine and undocumented movements between countries.

The outlook for the 1990s is that the trends in population movement briefly outlined at the beginning of the present paper will accelerate. This would seem inevitable since it is difficult to foresee any diminution of the macro-forces that underpin the recent increases in scale and complexity of population movements in developing countries. The next decade will undoubtedly see an increased tempo of substitution of capital for labour in agriculture in Africa and Asia together with further moves towards the commercialization of agricultural production, the privatization and consolidation of land, an increased emphasis on markets, and mechanization, which will push many more people out of the rural areas of those regions. Increased mobility will also be facilitated by the improvement in the average levels of education in the population since virtually all developing-country Governments are strongly committed to programmes to increase substantially the quantity and quality of education. The reorientation of values and attitudes wrought by education will be exacerbated to an even greater extent in the 1990s by the proliferation of mass media. Similarly the continual cheapening and increase in the accessibility, ease and speed of global and national transport systems is greatly facilitating movements of all types. The internationalization of capital also is encouraging enhanced levels of population movement although it is clear that the barriers to international population movements are considerably greater than those to capital flows. There can be no doubt that the growing trend towards globalization adds an important dimension to population movement.

Neo-classical economists point to interregional differences in wage rates as the fundamental cause of population movements. While the line of reasoning pursued in the present paper would suggest that this provides only a partial explanation, there is little or no indication that international or intranational differences in the supply of, and demand for, labour are going to diminish in the 1990s. Indeed at the international level these differences may well be increasing. Obviously on the demand side there are enormous differences between countries in their levels of economic growth and overall prosperity. However, countries are increasingly becoming differentiated with respect to the growth of their labour force. Those countries that began to experience a substantial fertility decline in the 1960s and early 1970s will, in the 1990s, have cohorts of diminishing size entering the labour force. When this phenomenon is combined with rapid economic growth as it is in places such as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan Province, China etc. it has produced a significant labour shortage ([33] and [35]). Yet, such situations are often found next to countries in which fertility decline has come much later or may not have begun at all. In such countries there tends to be a growing labour surplus. In Indonesia, for example, in the 1990s the net annual increment to the workforce will be 2.4 million persons, while 40 per cent of the existing workforce is underemployed [34]. China is said to have

200 million workers in excess of requirements [35]. Hence the potential for a substantial movement of labour between countries is present and likely to increase in the 1990s. It is clear also that inequalities between areas within many developing countries are also increasing, especially between large metropolitan areas and their hinterlands. It is difficult, therefore, to foresee any reductions in population mobility within and out of developing countries in the 1990s, especially between rural and urban areas.

The present paper has reasoned that any comprehensive explanation of the changes in the patterns of population mobility in developing countries must incorporate not only macroeconomic, political and social forces but also more micro-elements, especially those operating at the family and community levels. In particular, attention has been drawn to the crucial role of the family in mediating between the influence of macrostructural influences and individual migrants. It has been shown that a great deal of the population movement in developing countries results from a family's survival and adaptive strategies, which involve allocation of their labour across a variety of income-earning activities in a number of locations. Such strategies are designed to maximize family income while minimizing risk by diversifying the range of family income-generating sources. They have resulted in a wide variety of types of population movement: permanent as well as temporary moves of a diversity of periodicities, moves within and between countries, legal and clandestine moves, moves involving all gender, age, socio-economic and ethnic groups. The changing macrocontext has facilitated a greater intensity of this movement and its extension across a wider spatial area and among a greater spectrum of the population than ever before.

Another important element in the family nature of much of the mobility in contemporary developing countries is the development of networks linking the communities of origin and destination. Migrant networks are "sets of interpersonal ties that link migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through the bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin" ([48], p. 396). These networks play a crucial role in structuring population movement within and between countries and, once established, a process of cumulative causation is set in train so that the movement can become increasingly independent of the economic conditions that originally caused it. As Massey ([48], p. 397) has pointed out: "Networks increase the likelihood of movement because they lower the costs of relocation."

In any attempts at policy intervention these family networks must be given full consideration. Where Governments are seeking to encourage movement, policies that enhance or reinforce the development of such family networks will obviously be one of the more effective levers that could be used. However, where such networks are well established, policy interventions that seek to stop movement are almost always doomed to failure because the networks operate almost totally independently of the formal institutions normally subject to policy interventions. Certainly any effective policy intervention will be dependent upon a greater understanding of how family networks operate and the identification of the key actors in those networks, especially the increasing number of agents, recruiters, lawyers, migration advisers, marriage brokers and other gatekeepers who facilitate the flow of movers through the networks.

In looking to the future it is important also to consider the rapid and far-reaching changes that are occurring in families in developing countries. Traditional, emotionally extended families in which patriarchal (or matriarchal) authority is supreme are being eroded as nuclear families become predominant. In the latter case the dominant emotional and economic relationships are between partners and between parents and children. In such situations patriarchal authority is reduced and the ability of families to deploy their members in contradiction to the wishes of those individuals is being reduced. As the family's role as the basic unit of production is reduced, the development of nuclear family structures is encouraged. The control that patriarchal authorities can exert in such situations over the income earned by family members is also likely to be reduced, especially when they are separated by quite a long distance. Hence it can be anticipated that as development proceeds, the role of the family in using population mobility as a labour allocation mechanism may undergo change. Nevertheless it would seem that the importance of family networks will continue to be substantial in sustaining and shaping migration flows. Indeed

it would appear that over time, kinship and friendship networks become institutionalized with an increasing involvement of non-familial (and often profit-taking) elements.

In conclusion there can be little doubt that the acceleration of population mobility witnessed in the 1980s will continue. It would seem possible that it will continue to increase in scale, complexity and diversity. Apart from the likely continuation of the macro-forces considered in the present paper this burgeoning of movement will be facilitated by the huge number of people who have moved over the last decade. They have set up a myriad of new migration networks that will be increasingly activated and expanded during the 1990s.

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